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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
The Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision on May 5, 2005, upholding the 
decision of the District Court issued April 9, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a), and Rules of Appellate Procedure 46(a)(3) and (a)(4). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Question Presented for Review. 
Whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the standard governing a 
motion to disqualify trial counsel under Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 
weighing the hardship to the client against the prejudice suffered by the opposing party? 
This issue was preserved before the Court of Appeals and before the trial 
court. SunCrest, L.L.C. ("SunCrest") first raised with the trial court the issue of 
disqualification of Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. ("Snuffer") under Rule 3.7 as a 
necessary witness by its Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Denver C. 
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. ("Motion") on February 
19,2004. (R. 2144-42; 2216-145). D.J. Investment Group L.L.C. ("D.J. 
Investment") filed its Memorandum in Opposition to SunCrest's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on February 
25, 2004 ("Opposition"). (R. 2278-17). SunCrest filed its Reply on March 10, 
2004 ("Reply"). (R. 2415-295). On April 7, 2004, the district court heard oral 
argument, (R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and issued a written order denying 
SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer on April 9, 2004. (R. 2454-46). A copy 
of the district court's ruling is provided in SunCrest's Addendum at Tab 1. 
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SunCrest filed its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on April 29, 2004. The Court 
of Appeals handed down its decision on May 5, 2005. SunCrest filed a Petition 
for Certiorari with this Court on June 6, 2005. 
B. Standard of Review. 
The issue on which Certiorari was granted is one of law and is therefore subject to 
review de novo by this Court. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("in order to weigh the district court's exercise of its discretion [the appellate 
court] must resolve several purely legal questions," including the trial court's 
interpretation of an attorney disciplinary rule under a "de novo" review); State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932,937 (Utah 1994) (Utah appellate courts "generally consider de novo a trial 
court's statement of the legal rule"); Weeks v. Ind. Schools Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 
1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000) ("We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of the 
applicable rules of professional responsibility."); LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 876 
P.2d 184, 187 (Kan. App. 1994) ("[A] trial court's interpretation of a disciplinary rule is 
subject to a de novo review."); State v. Barnett 965 P.2d 323, 327 (N.M. 1998) ("[T]he 
abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate court from correcting errors 
premised on the trial court's misapprehension of the law.") 
Under the de novo standard, the appellate court must "apply [its] own independent 
judgment" to the trial court's interpretation of an attorney disciplinary rule. In re Grand 
Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d at 1488. 
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III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW. 
This Brief does not require determinative application of specific provisions of the 
Utah Constitution or Utah Code. It is concerned with the interpretation and application 
of Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and interpretive case authority. That 
Rule reads as follows: 
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered 
in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in the 
lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by 
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Procedural History 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of SunCrest's Motion to 
Disqualify Snuffer and his firm as D.J. Investment's counsel in the action underlying this 
appeal. (R. 2454-46). The underlying litigation involves, inter alia, a dispute over the 
meaning of paragraph 14 of the November 16, 2000 Settlement Agreement ("Settlement 
Agreement" or "Agreement") between SunCrest and D.J. Investment. (R. 793-85; R. 
2215). SunCrest believed the language of the Settlement Agreement was clear and 
unambiguous and, in light of the Agreement's integration clause, no parol evidence 
would be admitted at trial. (R. 1667; 1652; 1647-46; 1637; 1614; 1551). D.J. Investment 
took a similar view, although differing on the question of what paragraph 14 meant. On 
November 17, 2003, the district court found paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement 
ambiguous, making parol evidence as to its meaning admissible. (R. 2004-03). 
In response to the trial court's November 17 decision, SunCrest filed its Motion to 
Disqualify Snuffer on April 19, 2004. SunCrest asked the court to disqualify Mr. Snuffer 
as trial counsel on the grounds that its November decision made it likely that Snuffer was 
now a necessary witness within the meaning of Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct (R. 2144-42; R. 2216-145).1 On April 9, 2004, Judge Lynn Davis 
denied SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer. (R. 2454-46). The district court 
acknowledged that Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. could well implicate Rule 
3.7 but nonetheless declined to disqualify Snuffer because it found the motion untimely, 
and because Snuffer's disqualification would create a significant hardship for D.J. 
Investment. (R. 2452). 
On April 29, 2004, SunCrest filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order. (R. 2484-82). The Petition was granted and assigned to the Court of 
Appeals. (R. 2507). Following briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals handed 
down its opinion on May 5, 2005. A copy of that opinion is attached at Tab 2. 
On February 6, 2004, SunCrest's counsel sent Snuffer a letter giving notice that 
SunCrest intended file a Motion to Disqualify unless Snuffer withdrew as trial counsel, a 
copy of that letter is at Tab 3. 
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B. Statement of Facts, 
1. Initiation of the Underlying Lawsuit. 
D.J. Investment and SunCrest entered into the Agreement on November 16, 2000, 
resolving then pending disputes between them. (R. 793-85; R. 2215).2 The underlying 
lawsuit began May 7, 2001, when D.J. Investment filed suit seeking, inter alia, rescission 
of the November 2000 Agreement. (R. 149; R. 2215). The gravamen of that suit, as 
expressed in D.J. Investment's Second Amended Complaint, is the allegation that, in 
paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement, SunCrest promised to build a road for D.J. 
Investment south from SunCrest's property across land owned by Micron Technology, 
Inc. ("Micron") down to S.R. 92. D.J. Investment alleges that, during the negotiations 
leading to the Settlement Agreement, SunCrest falsely represented that it owned certain 
easements for a roadway across Micron's property. (R. 806, R. 2215). D.J. Investment 
claimed that its reliance on SunCrest's alleged representations during settlement 
negotiations was essential to its acceptance of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 806, R. 
2215). SunCrest denies that it promised to build D.J. Investment a road. SunCrest did 
agree to permit D.J. Investment to connect to any southern road SunCrest built 
connecting its property to S.R. 92. 
On November 17, 2003, in response to a motion by D.J. Investment for partial 
summary judgment, the district court held that paragraph 14 of the Agreement was 
ambiguous and stated that the court would admit parol evidence to clarify the meaning of 
2 Those disputes are irrelevant to this appeal and largely unrelated to the present 
litigation between the parties. (R. 793; R. 2215). 
that paragraph. (R. 2004-03). As a result of that ruling, it became clear for the first time 
that the testimony of all those present during the negotiations culminating in the 
November Settlement Agreement would be necessary for trial. (R. 2215-14). 
2. The Settlement Negotiations, 
The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over roughly a 
two-month period. (R. 2214; R. 2172). D.J. Investment was represented during these 
negotiations by: 
(a) Denver Snuffer (D.J. Investment's counsel); 
(b) David Mast ("Mast") (D.J. Investment's primary member and manager); and 
(c) Robert Christiansen ("Christiansen") (Vice President of U.S. General, Inc.).3 
(R. 2214, R. 2172, R. 2165). 
The parties reached an initial agreement memorialized on November 10, 2000. 
(D.J. Investment refers to this as the interim agreement. It does not include paragraph 
14.) Subsequent discussions led to the final Agreement executed on November 16, 2000, 
which is the subject of the underlying lawsuit. 
The initial agreement was the result of an all-night negotiating session beginning 
November 9, 2000 and lasting into the early morning hours of November 10th. (R. 2413, 
R. 2398-99). D.J. Investment was represented at this negotiating session by Snuffer and 
Christiansen. (R. 2413, R. 2399). (SunCrest was represented by Edward Grampp 
3
 US General is wholly owned by Mast, and joined in the Settlement Agreement. (R. 
000786). 
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("Grampp"), Bruce R. Baird ("Baird") and Michael F. Jones ("Jones"). (R. 2413, R. 
2394). Grampp was SunCrest's Vice President. Baird and Jones were SunCrest's 
counsel. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Mast did not attend this meeting. (R. 2214, R. 2399). At 
the beginning of the meeting on November 9, SunCrest offered D.J. Investment $50,000 
if the parties completed the Agreement during this session. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Snuffer 
stated that D.J. intended to finish the negotiations during that session to obtain the 
$50,000. (R. 2413, R. 2399). 
During the November 9 session, Snuffer negotiated nearly every sentence of the 
initial agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Although Christiansen testified that the two sides 
discussed the substance of paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement during this 
meeting, (R. 2214, R. 2162), he was unable to recall any of the details of the meeting. 
(R. 2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer was D.J. Investment's only other representative at 
the meeting. During this session, the parties completed the substantive portions of the 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Therefore Snuffer is the only person who 
can testify for D.J. Investment on the discussions - if there were any - surrounding what 
became paragraph 14 of the final Agreement during this critical initial session. (R. 
2210). 
Snuffer was not merely a passive witness. (R. 2413, R. 2399-98). Throughout the 
November 9/10 session, Snuffer, Baird, and Jones made changes to the Settlement 
Agreement on Snuffer's computer. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Moreover, Snuffer drafted some 
of the language independently. (R. 2413, R. 2398). At the conclusion of the session, the 
parties had completed the substantive portions of the Agreement, agreeing on nearly 
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every provision of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2398). Because the parties 
had completed the substantive portions of the Agreement within the required time frame, 
SunCrest agreed to and paid D.J. Investment $50,000 for completion of an agreement. 
(R. 2412, R. 2398). 
Snuffer then sent the Settlement Agreement to Mast in Phoenix. (R. 2412, R. 
2398). Mast, however, refused to honor the Agreement until minor changes were made.4 
(R. 2412, R. 2398). Consequently, Grampp and Baird flew to Phoenix on November 14, 
2000 to meet with Mast and address his new concerns. (R. 2412, R. 2398). On more 
than one occasion during this session, Snuffer participated by speakerphone. (R. 2412, R. 
2398-97). Snuffer and Mast apparently viewed the changes as insignificant since Snuffer 
did not represent his client in person nor did he participate in the entire meeting by 
phone. Because of the minor nature of these changes, SunCrest did not rescind the bonus 
for reaching the agreement on November 10th. (R. 2412, R. 2398).5 The parties 
finalized the Settlement Agreement during the Phoenix meeting, and Mast signed it on 
November 16th. (R. 2412, R. 2398-97). 
In addition to his participation in the negotiations of the Settlement Agreement, 
Snuffer also communicated extensively with SunCrest, both before and after the 
settlement. (R. 2214). Prior to SunCrest's purchasing the land for the SunCrest 
4
 Christiansen had full authority to execute on behalf of D.J. Investment. Mast's 
signature was therefore unnecessary. 
5 The few changes made to the Settlement Agreement in Phoenix mostly involved 
minor word changes, but the substance of the agreement, reached during the meeting at 
Snuffer's offices, did not change. (R. 2412, R. 2398). 
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development, Snuffer discussed the Micron easements in detail - a key issue in the 
underlying lawsuit - with Jeff Anderson, president of SunCrest Development 
Corporation (the developer of SunCrest's property). (R. 2214-13, R. 2159). In addition, 
Snuffer corresponded with a number of parties regarding the alignment of the road 
proposed to connect to S.R. 92. (R. 2213, R. 2157-45). Prior to either of the November 
negotiating sessions, Snuffer wrote SunCrest a letter acknowledging that he and his client 
possessed conflicting information regarding the easements across Micron's property: 
We have been told of its existence (although Micron denies it) but have 
never been furnished a copy of it. 
(R. 2403-02).6 Mast and Christiansen both testified that they did not speak with Micron 
during this period. The obvious, and ineluctable, inference is that Snuffer himself 
obtained this information from Micron. (R. 2413, R. 2403-02). 
3. Motion to Disqualify. 
On November 17, 2003, the district court ruled on D.J. Investment's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The district court denied the motion but 
declared paragraph 14 of the Agreement ambiguous, ruling that parol evidence 
would be admitted to clarify that paragraph's meaning. (R. 2004-03). In light of 
the trial court's ruling, SunCrest concluded that it was likely that it would need 
Snuffer's testimony regarding the settlement negotiations and regarding 
representations and/or reliance on representation concerning any easement over 
Micron property in order to fully present the facts necessary to resolve the 
The grants at issue are publicly recorded documents. (R. 1545-19). 
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underlying dispute. (R. 2215-14; R. 2210). D.J. Investment's principal (David 
Mast) did not attend the negotiating session at Snuffer's offices where the parties 
reached agreement on the substantive portions of the Agreement and, 
consequently, cannot testify about those negotiations. (R. 2214, R. 2413, R. 
2399). Christiansen, the only other D.J. Investment representative to attend the 
first set of negotiations, testified unequivocally that he does not remember the 
details of the negotiating session. (R. 2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer was D.J. 
Investment's only other representative at the meeting. (R. 2210). Thus, Snuffer's 
testimony will likely be necessary to the interpretation of paragraph 14 of the 
Agreement (to the extent parole evidence concerning the provision is ultimately 
admissible). 
In light of the district court's November 17th ruling, Snuffer's testimony became 
necessary to resolve the underlying dispute over paragraph 14. SunCrest therefore 
promptly filed its Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and Snuffer's firm on February 19, 2004. 
(R. 2144-42; 2216-145). On April 7, 2004, the court heard oral argument on the Motion 
(R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and on April 9, 2004, issued its ruling denying SunCresf s 
Motion. (R. 2454-46). The district court acknowledged that Snuffer's continued 
representation of D.J. Investment could well implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Order at ffl[ 3 & 5 (Tab 2). Nevertheless, the district court 
declined to disqualify Snuffer on the grounds that the motion was untimely and that 
Snuffer's disqualification would impose a significant hardship on D.J. Investment. (R. 
2452). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The heart of the underlying litigation is a dispute over the interpretation of a single 
paragraph in an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. Early in the case, 
plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the meaning of the disputed paragraph. 
The trial court denied the motion, holding the paragraph to be ambiguous. As a result, 
the testimony of all those who participated in the negotiation of the agreement, and the 
disputed paragraph in particular, became more important. Denver Snuffer, counsel for 
plaintiff, not only was directly involved in the negotiation, he is the only witness for the 
plaintiff who may be able to testify concerning the substance of the negotiations leading 
to the disputed paragraph. All of plaintiff s other witnesses have disavowed recollection 
of those specific negotiations. Consequently, Snuffer is likely to be a necessary witness 
at trial. 
Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires disqualification of an 
attorney who is likely to be a necessary witness. Shortly after the trial court's decision, 
SunCrest moved to disqualify Snuffer under Rule 3.7. The trial court denied SunCrest's 
motion on the grounds, inter alia, that doing so would impose a substantial burden on the 
plaintiff, D.J. Investment. The trial court did not consider the burdens Snuffer's 
continuation as trial counsel would impose on SunCrest or on the tribunal. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court, again finding that a significant burden would fall on 
Snuffer's client if he were to be disqualified as trial counsel. The Court of Appeals, 
however, failed to consider any burden imposed on SunCrest or on the court as a result of 
Snuffer's appearance as both counsel and witness. 
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Rule 3.7 requires a balancing of burdens. The burdens on the client if the attorney 
is disqualified are to be balanced against the burdens which would be imposed on the 
adverse party and on the tribunal if the attorney is permitted to appear both as trial 
counsel and as a witness. Rule 3.7, Comment ("a balancing is required"). The Court of 
Appeals did not engage in any balancing. It did not consider any burden other than that 
which might fall on Snuffer's client. The Court of Appeals did not consider the burdens 
on and prejudice to SunCrest should Snuffer appear both as trial counsel and as witness. 
The Court of Appeals also did not consider the difficulty which would face the tribunal, 
nor to the risk of confusion for the jury when Snuffer is both a witness and an advocate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF 
ALL OF THE PARTIES, AS REQUIRED BY RULE 3.7. 
A lawyer must be disqualified from serving as trial counsel where the lawyer is or 
is likely to be a necessary witness in the case unless "[disqualification of the lawyer 
would work a substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.7. The 
determination of whether the client would suffer a substantial hardship is neither 
mechanical nor acontextual. To make that determination, "a balancing is required 
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." Utah R. Prof. 
Conduct 3.7, Comment. Thus, a court facing a request for disqualification of trial 
counsel must, at the least, consider the relative burdens and interests of both the client 
and the adverse (or moving) party. 
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The Court of Appeals, like the trial court, concluded that D.J. Investment would 
suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer were to be disqualified as trial counsel. Both 
courts came to that conclusion by a legally mistaken analysis - an assumption of hardship 
to the client and consideration of that fact alone. Neither court attempted to balance the 
interests and burdens of all parties, although that is exactly what Rule 3.7 requires. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not consider the burden on SunCrest in any form (a 
legal error). See Opinion at 1 4 & 5 (Tab 2). Instead, the Court of Appeals considered 
only the hardship which D.J. Investment might conceivably suffer. Id. This one-sided 
and truncated analysis is inconsistent with the plain language of Rule 3.7 and with the 
o 
intent of the Rule as expressed by the Committee notes. It is a mistake of law. 
A balancing where only the interests of one party (the client) are considered is not 
a balancing at all. That analysis not only ignores Rule 3.7's requirement that the interests 
of all parties be considered and balanced, it also renders Rule 3.7 a nullity: a party will 
always suffer some hardship if its trial counsel is disqualified, even if the disqualification 
occurs years before trial (as is the case here). If the loss of one's chosen counsel is the 
only interest considered, the loss will always be substantial because there is no 
comparison. 
7 Because no court has ever made a determination of whether Snuffer is a necessary 
witness, it is difficult to see how a court could properly weigh the respective interests -
SunCrest's interests are not even acknowledged so the harm to it of permitting Snuffer to 
appear both as a witness and trial counsel has never been assessed. 
8 The error is even starker considered in light of the amendments to Rule 3.7 which 
become effective November 1 of this year. 
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A. The Courts Below Failed To Consider That SunCrest Will Suffer 
Substantial Hardship And Prejudice If Snuffer Is Permitted to Appear 
Both As A Witness And As Trial Counsel. 
Disqualification under Rule 3.7 entails consideration of the hardship and prejudice 
suffered by the moving party and by the court, as well as that suffered by the opposing 
party. Rule 3.7, Comment (balancing "required"). SunCrest will be prejudiced if Snuffer 
is permitted to appear both as trial counsel and as a witness at trial.9 SunCrest will suffer 
"substantial hardship," and that hardship must be, but was never considered by the courts 
below. The burden on SunCrest takes several forms. 
Permitting a lawyer to appear both as trial counsel and as a fact witness in the 
same case will be confusing for the jury. In one role, Mr. Snuffer will be an advocate, 
arguing the reliability and integrity of (other) witnesses, objecting to questions and 
answers, and arguing legal questions. In that role, he will make his opening and closing 
arguments, in each discussing the evidence, and in the latter arguing for a particular 
interpretation of the evidence and assessments of the (other) witnesses. Only attorneys 
fill this role at trial; only attorneys have leave to argue the evidence to the jury. 
In the second role, Snuffer will be like any other witness. He will take the stand 
and be examined and cross-examined. But, unlike any other witness, he will make his 
own objections to questions. And, unlike any other witness, he will cross-examine 
9 "That counsel should avoid appearing both as advocate and witness except under 
special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 
1985) interpreting prior Rule 5-102(A)) (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 
671 (7th Cir. 1983). "The great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel to 
continue representation where he or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues 
that are not incidental or insignificant." Id. 
1 A 
himself. All of this special conduct - and there is no doubt that it will be special conduct, 
quite unlike any other witness - will inevitably give his testimony undue weight with the 
jury, and his arguments as an advocate undue weight as well. The very fact of his 
testimony lends credibility to his legal arguments. After all, he, unlike opposing counsel, 
witnessed it all. That dual role prejudices to SunCrest, creating a substantial and unfair 
burden. 
While this double role might in theory allow Snuffer to "be more easily subject to 
impeachment for interest and thus lessens his effectiveness as a witness," it will certainly 
disadvantage SunCrest. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (quoting Commonwealth v. Floyd, 431 
A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. 1981)); see World Youth Day v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 
1303 (N.D.Colo. 1994); Merrill Lynch Fin. Bus, v. Novell., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174 
(D.Colo. 2003); Miller v. Colo. Farms, Action No. 97-WY-2015-WD, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7553 (D. Colo., May 30, 2001). As the United States District Court noted, "the underlying 
purpose of Rule 3.7 . . . is to avoid the prejudice associated with the jury confusion 
resulting from an attorney acting as both advocate and witness." World Youth Day, 866 
F. Supp. at 1303. 
That purpose will be entirely frustrated if the court refuses to weigh the hardship 
to the moving party. The Rule will have no meaning if the parties are required to wait 
until after the trial is over before jury confusion is addressed, yet that seems the only 
alternative left open by the Court of Appeals. 
To answer that confusion is a mere possibility, that a lawyer filling a double role 
mightbz less credible than other witnesses will not do. It is at least as likely that the 
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lawyer will make for a more credible witness merely because he remains before the jury 
throughout the case and is positioned to argue for his own credibility at every stage. A 
priori, of course, we cannot know how a jury will react to a lawyer fulfilling two roles. 
But that is precisely the point - permitting such an event invites prejudicial jury 
confusion. The risk of such prejudice should be refused. As Rule 3.7 makes clear, the 
presumption properly is that a lawyer in a double role should not be permitted. A court 
considering only the potential inconvenience (or hardship) to the attorney's client thereby 
elides the equally or more important consideration of hardship on the moving party. That 
is exactly what happed here. The Court of Appeals did not merely mis-weigh the 
burdens, it failed even to consider the burdens on SunCrest. 
B. The Opinions Below Also Ignore The Substantial Burden on the 
Tribunal. 
The double role of trial counsel appearing as a witness also places unusual burdens 
on the judicial system and on the court. These burdens also should be (but were not) 
considered in weighing the balance of hardships, as required under Rule 3.7. If Snuffer 
appears both as trial counsel and as a witness, the trial court will need to remind the jury 
each time Snuffer changes roles exactly which role he is then fulfilling and that his 
double roles must not affect their views about either the rest of the case or about 
Snuffer's fulfillment of either of the roles. This procedure cannot help but create 
confusion and involve the court in constant intrusions into the parties' presentations of 
their respective cases. 
16 
This Court has recognized the extraordinary burden imposed on a court when 
counsel acts both as an advocate and as a witness. Proposed Rule 3.7, Comment 2 (Tab 
4). The changes in Rule 3.7, as effective in November 2005, are not substantive 
alterations, but rather constitute minor clarifications. The new Comments do not mark 
substantive transformations but instead provide further clarification of the import of Rule 
3.7 and its intended application. The new Comments give express recognition of factors 
which the courts were always to have considered in deciding a motion to disqualify under 
Rule 3.7. The burden on the adverse party, always expressly noted in the Comments, 
entailed exactly such burdens on the tribunal as well. See Comments 2, 3 (Tab 4). 
Because these burdens are also substantial, they are substantial hardships on the tribunal. 
Allowing Snuffer to proceed in this double role will make the court's decisions 
with respect to objections to evidence (and other legal questions) appear assessments of 
Snuffer's credibility as a witness. That, in turn, will invoke still more commentary by the 
court concerning counsel. The court will be involved in an endless cycle of 
distinguishing for the jury between Snuffer as advocate and Snuffer as witness. That 
conflict comes into starkest contrast when Snuffer takes the stand as a witness - how 
does the trial court arrange for his cross-examination, and for him to object to questions 
he is being asked?10 Will Snuffer hop off the stand for each question posed on behalf of 
10 If Snuffer has co-counsel who handles his examination, then co-counsel should be 
able to handle the remainder of the trial, and Snuffer's disqualification would not work a 
substantial hardship on D.J. Investment sufficient to outweigh the hardship on SunCrest 
and the trial court. 
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his client? Is he to object from the witness box, or step down and do this? This situation 
is simply unworkable. 
II. THE HARDSHIP ON SNUFFER'S CLIENT IS AFFECTED BY THE 
STATUS OF THE CASE WHEN THE MOTION IS MADE.. 
Consideration of a motion to disqualify trial counsel pursuant to Rule 3.7 requires 
the court to consider the burden disqualification would impose on the disqualified 
attorney's client and the burdens on the adverse party and the tribunal. Rule 3.7, 
Comment O'a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the 
opposing party"). The nature and weight of the hardship on the attorney's client varies 
dramatically with the nature of the case and, more importantly, the status of the case. 
The Court of Appeals failed to even consider the procedural posture in its opinion. 
Because the Court of Appeals treated any hardship to Snuffer's client as substantial 
hardship, it effectively found that the disqualification alone would always be a burden 
sufficient to justify denial of a motion under Rule 3.7, no matter how far the case was 
from trial. Opinion at 3 (discussing only the burden on DJ. Investment) (Tab 1). That 
interpretation of the hardship exception renders the Rule pointless. 
The potential burden on Snuffer's client varies dramatically depending on when 
the motion to disqualify is brought, the nature of the case, the number of other attorneys 
on the trial team, etc. In this instance, for example, the motion was brought early in the 
case. The trial court denied SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify in April 2004. Discovery in 
the case continued until the end of September 2005, almost a year and half. In fact, the 
greater portion of discovery occurred after the trial court denied SunCrest's Motion. The 
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point is that disqualification at an early stage of litigation must involve a lower burden on 
the client than would disqualification on the eve of trial. Indeed, all of the cases SunCrest 
has found denying disqualification, and most of the cases granting or upholding 
disqualification, involved motions brought between the close of discovery and trial. (A 
marked contrast to this case, where the motion was brought early in discovery.) Transfer 
to new trial counsel11 when the case is early in discovery is far less burdensome than is 
transfer just before trial. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court even allowed for 
this possibility. 
Similarly, disqualification just before trial does and should weigh differently when 
it would be disqualification of the sole attorney rather than one of a large team. The 
reason is clear - there is a lesser burden on the client where other attorneys are already 
familiar with the case. The same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandus, to weighing 
burdens when the case is ready for trial and when it is in the early stages of discovery. 
Transition to new trial counsel in the early stages of discovery is, obviously, far less 
burdensome than on the eve of trial. 
The failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to consider these issues is 
fatal to the Opinion below, not because the Court of Appeals failed to give the proper 
weight to these factors (or to the hardship on SunCrest), or because it assigned too much 
weight to the possible hardship on Snuffer's client. The failure is fatal because the Court 
11 It should be noted that disqualification of an attorney under Rule 3.7 as trial counsel 
does not require the attorney to withdraw from the case entirely. He or she may still 
participate in case preparation, motion work, etc. 
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of Appeals did not consider these factors at all, and so did not balance the respective 
hardships. 
The burden on Snuffer's client cannot properly be weighed against the burden on 
either the trial court or on SunCrest without reaching the nature of the testimony which 
makes it likely that Snuffer will be a necessary witness. The court must make that 
determination as a prerequisite to the weighing, not only because the Rule as written 
requires such a finding, but because the finding is essential to the weighing of hardships 
and burdens mandated under the Rule. To see this distinction, one need only consider 
that the attorney might, for example, be a necessary witness for one out of sixteen causes 
of action, or a necessary witness as to all sixteen. The burdens in the two scenarios are 
rather different. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals gives no hint of these considerations, nor 
does the order of the trial court. In effect, the Court of Appeals found that any burden 
was too much of a burden under 3.7. That decision is error, a mistake of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals did not "mis-apply" the balancing test required under Rule 
3.7. It did not fail to assign the proper weight to one burden or another. The issue here is 
not that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the evidence in a light SunCrest favors. 
The error below is of a different kind. The Court of Appeals, like the trial court before it, 
did not engage in any balancing test at all. The Court of Appeals did not balance the 
burden on or prejudice to SunCrest because it did not consider them. It treated the 
burden to D.J. Investment as the sole factor to be considered: if there was a burden to D.J. 
Investment, then the burden was substantial and necessarily outweighed any and all 
burdens to SunCrest, or to the tribunal (and to the jury). 
If Rule 3.7 has any meaning at all, the opinion of the Court of Appeals must be 
rejected. Every disqualification of counsel imposes a significant burden on the client. 
The client loses its chosen advocate and must incur the costs of new counsel learning the 
case. But, pace the Court of Appeals, that cannot be the end of analysis under Rule 3.7. 
The interests of and burdens on the opposing party must also be considered. The burdens 
on the trial court and the jury must be weighed. Finding a significant burden on the client 
is only the start of analysis, not the end. The Court of Appeals considered only the 
potential burden on D.J. Investment. In so doing, it eviscerated Rule 3.7, and made an 
error of law. 
SunCrest respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion below. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 2005. 
HOWREY LLP 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
D.J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C., a Delaware limited, 
liability company; DRAPER CITY, a municipal 
corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DAE/WESTBROOK L.L.C'S 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DENVER C. 
SNUFFER, JR. AND NELSON SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Civil No. 010402305 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer 
Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen. Oral arguments were held on April 7,2004. Richard 
Casey appeared on behalf of DAE/Westbrook ("Westbrook") and Denver Snuffer appeared on 
behalf of D.J. Investment Group ("D.J."). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully 
considered the Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling. 
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I. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY & RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. In October 2000 Westbrook entered D.J.'s property and began building a roadway in order to 
conform with city regulations that required communities of 20+ dwellings to have more than one 
road leading to and from the community. 
2. D.J. filed a lawsuit in the 4th District Court to abate what it considered to be a trespass on the 
part of Westbrook and also sued for damages. 
3. On November 16,2000 in Phoenix, Arizona, the parties created a multifaceted agreement 
containing, among other things, provisions dismissing D.J.'s lawsuit and allowing Westbrook to 
continue using the access road on D.J.'s property. Denver Snuffer ("Snuffer"), D.J.'s attorney, 
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation the agreement. 
4. Provision 14 of the agreement allowed D.J. the use of a not-yet-created "Southerly Roadway" 
that would be located on Micron property abutting D.J.'s property. The original route 
contemplated would give D.J. access to State Road 92 by way of this "Southerly Road." 
5. Despite Westbrook's representations that it had secured the necessary easements to construct 
the Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements may not have been obtained and Westbrook 
is now preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a different route that does not provide D.J. 
with any access to State Road 92. On May 7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of the 
settlement agreement and began this current litigation. 
6. On June 8,2001, Westbrook filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint. 
7. On December 20, 2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2003. 
9. D.J. filed its Reply to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 5, 2003. 
10. On August 7,2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
11. On August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
12. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
August 27, 2003. Richard Casey appeared on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared 
on behalf of D.J. At the conclusion of Oral Arguments the Court took the matter under 
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advisement. 
13. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the November 16, 2000 
settlement agreement. The corresponding Order denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was signed and filed on January 7, 2004. 
14. On February 19, 2004, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
15. On February 25, 2004, D.J. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
16. After being granted additional time to respond to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C, Westbrook filed its 
Reply to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17,2004. 
17. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C 
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on April 7, 2004. Richard Casey appeared 
on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared on behalf of D.J. 
18. Denver Snuffer has served as D.J.'s counsel in the case at bar from the inception of the 
original litigation to the present time. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Westbrook contends this Court should disqualify Snuffer in the case at bar because 
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this litigation violates Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. D.J. argues this Court should not disqualify Snuffer because Snuffer is not 
a necessary witness in the case at bar and disqualifying Snuffer at this point in the litigation would 
inflict substantial hardship on D.J. Although Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in the case 
at bar may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court declines to 
disqualify Snuffer because Westbrook's request is untimely and would inflict significant hardship 
on D.J. 
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A. SNUFFER'S ACTIONS IN THE CASE AT BAR IMPLICATE RULE 3.7 
Westbrook alleges that Snuffer's representation of D.J. in the case at bar violates Rule 3.7 
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered 
in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the 
client. 
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the prohibition 
against serving as counsel and witness and indicated that "[i]f an attorney attempts to combine the 
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both as 
advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard, 
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985). The Leonard Court also indicated that "application of this rule 
does not depend on whether an attorney will be called bu t . . . on whether he 'ought to be called as 
a witness' in the underlying action." Id. 
D.J. notes that Rule 3.7 only applies when an attorney is a necessary witness during the 
trial. Snuffer, D.J. contends, is not a necessary witness and therefore should not be disqualified. A 
lawyer is generally only considered a necessary witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material 
and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 
(D. Colo. 1994). Furthermore, Utah courts have indicated that disqualification of a lawyer may 
not be necessary if his or her testimony only relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues. Leonard, 
101 P.2d at 653. 
The factual disputes between the parties make it difficult for the Court to make a 
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conclusive determination as to whether Snuffer was sufficiently involved in the settlement 
negotiations to warrant his designation as a "necessary" witness in the case at bar. Although 
Westbrook and D.J. provide very different renditions of Snuffer's role in the negotiations leading 
up to the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement, both accounts demonstrate that Snuffer was 
present during many of the negotiation sessions and advised David Mast and Robert Christensen 
on matters related to such settlement negotiations. While Snuffer's involvement may have 
rendered him a "necessary" witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to 
reach such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the "special 
circumstances" exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
B. DISQUALIFYING SNUFFER WOULD "WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP" ON D.J. 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct will not prevent a lawyer from 
advocating at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness if "[disqualification of 
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
3.7. In order to determine whether a client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "a balancing is 
required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." UTAH RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7, Comment. 
This Court, after the weighing the interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer at 
this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J. The case at bar was filed in 
May of 2001, almost three years ago, and since that time the parties have vigorously litigated an 
extraordinary number of legal issues. The Court also notes that the parties have conducted a 
significant amount of discovery in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, of the key 
witnesses have been deposed and written discovery has been sent out and answered by both 
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parties. All things considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed, 
the Court file now fills seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal 
issues. The Clerk of the Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, the 
Court doubts another attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes that 
such an effort would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and money. 
Furthermore, this Court believes that Westbrook could have significantly reduced the costs 
of bringing new counsel up to speed if Westbrook had filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver 
Snuffer in a more timely fashion. In Zion 's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed 
and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification." 
In Jensen jhz Utah Court of Appeals held that Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel was 
untimely because it was filed more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more 
than three months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. In contrast to Jensen, 
Westbrook's own pleadings intimate that Westbrook has "reasonably foreseen," since the initiation 
of this litigation, that Snuffer might be called, as a witness in the case at bar. 
Westbrook argues that Snuffer only became a "necessary" witness in this litigation at the 
time the Court indicated that it would accept parole evidence regarding the settlement agreement. 
Even if Westbrook's argument is accepted as true this Court can still find Westbrook's filing was 
untimely. Westbrook filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer on February 19, 2004, roughly 
three months after the Court's November 17, 2003 decision to accept parole evidence on the 
settlement agreement at issue. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel was untimely because it was filed "more than three months" after Jensen 
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became aware of the potential conflict." Jensen 781 P.2d at 481. Similarly, this Court could find 
that Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer was untimely because it was filed more 
than three months after Westbrook became aware of the Court's decision to accept parole 
evidence regarding the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement. 
But the Court must examine the entire procedural history to determine timeliness. One can 
argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the 
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation of the 
language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that 
settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001) 
More importantly at the time of the filing of Summary Judgment/Partial Summary 
Judgment, defendants were placed on notice that plaintiffs intended to rely on a variety of 
collateral documents (renderings, blueprints, bonds, etc.) to show the alignment of the subject 
road. (Date: December 20, 2002). If that were not enough, at oral argument on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, this position became abundantly clear. (Date: August 27, 2003). 
Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the case at bar would result in significant 
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of Westbrook's untimely filing of its Motion to 
Disqualify, this Court rejects Westbrook's motion and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from 
this litigation. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. Plaintiffs counsel is 
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instructed to prepare an order consistent with the findings contained herein. 
DATED this f^ day of April, 2004. 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
fl Appellant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. (Westbrook)1 argues that the 
trial court erred by denying its Motion to Disqualify Denver C. 
Snuffer Jr. and the law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, 
P.C. (collectively Snuffer). We affirm. 
%2 On November 16, 2000, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement, which dismissed D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C.'s (D.J.) 
lawsuit against Westbrook. Snuffer, attorney for D.J., was 
involved in the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement. 
On May 7, 2 001, D.J. rescinded the settlement agreement and filed 
suit against Westbrook. Nearly three years later, Westbrook 
filed a Motion to Disqualify Snuffer, relying primarily on Utah 
1. Since filing its Motion to Disqualify, Westbrook has changed 
its name to SunCrest, L.L.C. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. The trial court denied the 
Motion to Disqualify, and Westbrook subsequently filed this 
interlocutory appeal. 
f3 The standard of review generally for decisions relating to 
disqualification is abuse of discretion, unless the court is 
called upon to resolve solely a legal or ethical issue. See 
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998) 
(holding that because no issues of fact were presented to the 
trial court, "to the extent this [c]ourt has a special interest 
in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a 
trial court's discretion is limited"). In contrast, "[w]here 
courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and 
the quantity of less tangible factors implicating the trial 
court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better 
position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their 
application to the legal standard at issue." Id. (citing State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's 
ruling incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Margulies v. 
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial 
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law . . . . 
the proper standard of review . . . is the abuse of discretion 
standard"). 
f4 Westbrook argues that the trial court erred by finding that 
Snuffer's disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
D.J. and by not balancing the interests of the parties.2 
According to rule 3.7, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a 
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 
except where . . . [d]isqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct 
3.7(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether an attorney 
should be disqualified on the grounds contemplated by rule 3.7, 
the trial court is required to balance the client's interests 
with those of the opposing party. See Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct 3.7 
2. Westbrook also argues that the trial court erred by failing 
to determine whether Snuffer was a necessary witness. However, 
it was not essential that the trial court determine whether 
Snuffer was a "necessary witness" under rule 3.7 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct because, even if it had, the 
hardship exception would have compelled the same result: 
Snuffer's disqualification would force undue hardship upon D.J. 
cmt. However, even if there is risk of prejudice to the opposing 
party, "due regard must be given to the effect of 
disqualification on the lawyer1s client." Id. (emphasis added).3 
f5 Here, the trial court weighed the interests of the parties 
and found that D.J. would face substantial hardship in both time 
and money if forced to hire new counsel at such a late stage of 
discovery. Specifically, the court noted that 
[t]he case at bar was filed in May of 2001, 
almost three years ago, and since that time 
the parties have vigorously litigated an 
extraordinary number of legal issues. The 
[c]ourt also notes that the parties have 
conducted a significant amount of discovery 
in connection with this litigation. Most, if 
not all, of the key witnesses have been 
deposed and written discovery has been sent 
out and answered by both parties. All things 
considered, the parties have engaged in a 
substantial amount of work. Indeed, the 
[c]ourt file now fills seven exceptionally 
thick folders and addresses some very complex 
legal issues. The [c] lerk of the [c]ourt has 
just opened the eighth file. Under these 
circumstances, the [c]ourt doubts another 
attorney could be brought up to speed in this 
matter and recognizes that such an effort 
would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant 
amount of time and money. 
3. When issues of professional discretion arise, the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct call for self-governance. In particular, 
the rules state, 
Violation of a [r]ule should not give rise to 
a cause of action, nor should it create any 
presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached. The [r]ules are designed to 
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through 
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed 
to be a basis for civil liability. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the [rjules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons. 
Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct Scope. 
f6 The trial court also found that Westbrook filed its motion 
in an untimely manner. We agree. A motion to disqualify counsel 
is untimely when it is not "immediately filed and diligently 
pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for 
disqualification." Zions First Nat' 1 Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(emphasis added) (holding that the defendants' motion to 
disqualify counsel was untimely because it was filed three months 
after it learned of the representation, and one day before the 
opponent's motion to compel settlement was scheduled for 
hearing). Here the parties were aware that Snuffer would likely 
be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing 
their motion, if not earlier.4 Thus, had Westbrook timely filed 
its motion, it could have significantly reduced D.J.'s costs of 
retaining and bringing new counsel up to speed. 
f7 Because D.J. would face substantial hardship if forced to 
retain new counsel at this late stage and Westbrook's motion to 
disqualify Snuffer was untimely, we hold that the trial court 
properly denied Westbrook's motion. Accordingly, we affirm. 
QU^^L m. r&J£+^> 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
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Russell W. 
Associate 
Sgory K. Orme, Judge 
4. At the time the underlying lawsuit was filed, both parties 
were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement 
agreement. Likewise, the parties were aware of Snuffer's 
participation from the arguments presented for and against D.J.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, even if Westbrook did not 
believe that Snuffer was a necessary witness until the trial 
court indicated parole evidence would be taken in regard to the 
settlement agreement, Westbrook failed to file its Motion to 
Disqualify until three months later. 
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1 Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. ("Westbrook"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, hereby respectfully moves this Court for an order disqualifying Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., 
plaintiffs counsel, from participating in this case. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this lawsuit, Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. ("Snuffer") represents the plaintiff, DJ. Investment 
Group, L.L.C. ("D.J."), and plaintiffs primary member and manager, David Mast ("Mast"). 
Snuffer also represented D.J. and Mast during the events underlying this litigation and more 
specifically, was directly involved in the negotiations of the November 16, 2000 Settlement 
Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), that forms the center of this dispute. Snuffer, as one of 
the main negotiators for D. J, is a key witness to a number of the events surrounding the 
Settlement Agreement. Because Snuffer's testimony regarding these events will be critical in 
resolving the dispute before this Court, Snuffer is a necessary witness in the present lawsuit. 
Snuffer's dual representation of D.J., in both the present lawsuit and in the events underlying this 
lawsuit, violates the ethical obligations imposed by Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this matter. Therefore, Westbrook respectfully 
moves this Court to disqualify Snuffer and his law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
from further participation in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 16, 2000, DJ. and Westbrook entered into a court-approved Settlement 
Agreement settling prior litigation over property unrelated to the present lawsuit. See Settlement 
Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A; DJ. Am. Compl. f 20. However, on May 7,2001, DJ. 
filed suit seeking rescission of the Settlement Agreement, thus beginning this lawsuit. In its 
Amended Complaint, D J. complains that during the settlement negotiations, Westbrook made 
false representations regarding its easements running over property belonging to Micron 
Technologies, Inc., ("Micron"). See id <f 20. In entering into the Settlement Agreement, D J. 
claims it relied upon representations by Westbrook made during settlement negotiations 
regarding those easements and the potential road alignment of SunCrest Drive, which was to 
connect Westbrook's property to the Alpine Highway, S.R. U-92 ("S.R. U-92"). See id. ff 20, 
22. The Court has found the paragraph relating to the road connecting with S.R. U-92 
ambiguous and plans to allow parol evidence to clarify its meaning. Ruling on PL's Mot. to 
2 
Strike and Ruling on PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at 12. As a result, the 
testimony of those present for the settlement negotiations is critical. 
The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over a roughly two-
month period. Deposition of David Mast, July 8, 2003 at 76 ("Mast Dep."), attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. Snuffer was heavily involved in the negotiations, as it was he, along with Mast and 
U.S. General's (another company owned by Mast) vice president, Bob Christiansen 
("Christiansen"), who were the only negotiators for D.J. See id. at 75, Ex. B; see Deposition of 
Robert Christiansen, July 2, 2003 at 21 ("Christiansen Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
Snuffer also "collaborated" with Westbrook's then attorneys, Bruce R. Baird and Michael F. 
Jones,1 on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Christiansen Dep. at 25, Ex. C. Specifically, 
an agreement in principle along with an agreement as to the majority of the final settlement 
document language was reached after an all-night negotiation and drafting session at Snuffer's 
offices. Snuffer and Christiansen, but not Mast, were present at this meeting. Id at 28, Ex. C. 
Christiansen testified that during this meeting the two sides discussed the "critical" paragraph 14 
of the Agreement, which D.J. claims grants it access to S.R. U-92. Id, at 33, Ex. C. However, 
Christiansen did not remember the details of this meeting. IdL at 28, 34, Ex. C. Additionally, 
although not present during the Phoenix meeting, where the agreement was finalized, Snuffer 
participated in the final negotiations by telephone conference calls and through e-mail. IdL at 25, 
Ex.C. 
1
 Both Baird and Jones of Baird & Jones, L.C., represented Westbrook during the negotiations of the 
Settlement Agreement and also participated in the drafting of the Settlement Agreement. (Baird and Jones still 
represent Westbrook in the ongoing development of the SunCrest project.) Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who also 
litigate many matters, realized the conflict that would arise if they represented Westbrook in litigation involving 
matters in which they had substantially participated and in which they were likely to be called to testify. 
Recognizing their ethical obligations, Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones referred the present case out to Westbrook's current 
litigation counsel. 
3 
Snuffer was also involved communications with Westbrook both before and after the 
actual settlement negotiations. Prior to the settlement negotiations, Snuffer discussed the Micron 
easements, a key issue in the present lawsuit, with Jeff Anderson ("Anderson"), president of 
SunCrest Development Corporation Deposition of Jeff Anderson, July 8, 2002 at 35-36 
("Anderson Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit D. Snuffer told Anderson that Westbrook had 
"easement rights out to U92." Id at 36. In addition, after the Settlement Agreement was signed, 
Snuffer remained heavily involved in events related to this lawsuit. Snuffer corresponded with 
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to 
S.R. U-92. See, e.g., Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike 
Mazuran, April 11, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit E. Furthermore, both before and after the 
Settlement Agreement was signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast 
and Christiansen. See, ej*., Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter 
to Jeff Anderson, January 27, 2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001, 
attached hereto as Exhibit F. Lastly, Westbrook met with Mast and Snuffer to inform them of 
Micron's unwillingness to allow the road to S.R. U-92 to be built on the west side of its property. 
CUE 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISQUALIFY SNUFFER FROM REPRE-
SENTING DJ. BECAUSE THIS REPRESENTATION VIOLATES THE 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND WILL TAINT 
THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE. 
This Court should disqualify Snuffer from further participation in this case because his 
representation in the present lawsuit violates the ethical obligations of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct and will taint the legal proceedings in this case. The trial judge has the 
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power to control attorneys' conduct in trial litigation, including disqualifying counsel after 
finding an ethical violation. Margulis v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah 1985). Snuffer 
has violated ethical Rule 3.7. Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client. 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
"the role of advocate and witness should be separated. If an attorney attempts to combine the 
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both 
as advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question.'" State v. 
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669,671 
(7th Cir. 1983); interpreting prior ethical Rule 5-102(A)). As the Comment to Rule 3.7 explains: 
The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice 
that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of 
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence 
given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should 
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7, Comment (emphasis added). Consequently, 
"[t]he great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel to continue representation where 
he or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues that are not incidental or 
insignificant." Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Since Snuffer is a "necessary" witness and his 
disqualification would not "work a substantial hardship" on D.J., he should be disqualified from 
any further representation of D.J. in this matter. 
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A. Snuffer is a Necessary Witness Because He Participated Extensively in 
Settlement Negotiations and Has First-Hand Knowledge of Facts 
Material to the Present Lawsuit. 
Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is a "necessary" witness or "ought to be" one. A 
lawyer is a "'necessary' witness if his or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable 
elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc., v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exchange, Inc., 866 F. 
Supp. 1297,1302 (D. Colo. 1994); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 
1066 (Utah 1991) (noting that the "need for the testimony of counsel must be compelling and... 
necessary"). Therefore, if the lawyer's testimony relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues, 
withdrawal or disqualification may not be necessary. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Furthermore, 
the attorney does not necessarily have to be called as a witness; that the lawyer "ought to be a 
witness" in the underlying action is enough. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. 
Specifically, where the attorney may be a witness because of his role as a negotiator or 
drafter of an agreement, the general rule is that where "'a lawyer negotiates, executes and 
administers a contract, and is the key witness at trial, he must be disqualified.'" Tiuman v. 
Canant, No. 92 Civ. 5813 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6626, *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,1994). In 
World Youth Day, the court disqualified a lawyer who had "first-hand non-privileged knowledge 
of many relevant and material facts at issue in t[he] case." 866 F. Supp. at 1302. The lawyer had 
"extensive involvement in the negotiation process," participated in telephone negotiations 
directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim, and participated in numerous other communications 
with the plaintiff. Id. at 1302. Furthermore, the lawyer's testimony was "essential in 
establishing whether a valid and enforceable contract was initially formed." Id at 1303. 
Likewise, the court in Acme Analgesics, Ltd. v. Lemmon Co., 602 F. Supp. 306, 306-307 
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(S.D.N.Y. 1985), disqualified an attorney and his firm because he negotiated the contract upon 
which the case was brought and would likely be a material witness at trial for that very reason. 
Snuffer's involvement in the underlying events of the present lawsuit are almost identical 
to the disqualified lawyers' involvement in World Youth Day and Acme Analgesics, given that 
he participated in the negotiations and administration of the Settlement Agreement. First, 
Snuffer had "extensive involvement in the negotiation process" and therefore participated in 
events relevant to this lawsuit. He was one of the main negotiators on DJ. 's side, and as such, 
participated in many of the negotiation sessions, including a key session held at his offices. See 
Christiansen Dep. at 28, Ex. C. Furthermore, Snuffer "collaborated" with Westbrook's attorneys 
on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Snuffer's testimony is critical in explaining the 
circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement and in establishing the intent and 
intended effect of the agreement. In particular, Christiansen does not remember many details 
regarding the key meeting at Snuffer's office, but he does remember that the critical paragraph 
14 of the Settlement Agreement was discussed. See icl at 28, 33-34, Ex. C. Snuffer's testimony 
is needed to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the discussion of this critical paragraph 
since he was DJ. 's only other representative at the meeting. Third, Snuffer had numerous 
communications with Westbrook, including his discussion of the critical easements with 
Anderson. See Anderson Dep. at 35-36, Ex. D. His knowledge regarding these easements is 
critical to establishing whether Westbrook made false representations regarding these easements. 
Furthermore, Snuffer participated in the administration of the agreement, corresponding with 
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to 
S.R. U-92. See, e^., Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike 
Mazuran, April 11, 2001. Furthermore, both before and after the Settlement Agreement was 
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signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast and Christiansen. See, e.g., 
Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter to Jeff Anderson, January 27, 
2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001. Snuffer was present when 
Westbrook informed D.J. of Micron's unwillingness to allow Westbrook to build the road. This 
conversation is critical to establishing the good faith belief of Westbook at the time of 
negotiations and the subsequent change in circumstances. 
Such involvement cannot be considered "incidental or insignificant." Instead, Snuffer's 
knowledge regarding these events is "relevant, material, and unobtainable elsewhere," because 
Snuffer has "first-hand knowledge" of many material facts related to the settlement negotiations 
and events that took place both before and after the negotiations. Specifically, Snuffer is the 
only witness on D.J.'s side who can give testimony regarding the key meeting that took place at 
his offices. Given his "first-hand knowledge" of key, material facts, Snuffer "ought to be a 
witness" in the present action and should therefore be disqualified. 
B. Snuffer's Disqualification Would Not Work a Substantial Hardship 
on DJ. Because the Possibility Was Foreseeable, DJ. Has Sufficient 
Funds to Obtain New Counsel, and the New Counsel Would Have 
Ample Time to Prepare for Trial. 
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, even where a lawyer is found to be a 
necessary witness and the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice, the lawyer will not be 
disqualified where (1) "[t]he testimony relates to an uncontested issue, (2) "[t]he testimony 
relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case"; or (3) "[disqualification of 
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 3.7. The Comment to the Rule states: 
Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, 
the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the 
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lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such 
prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be 
given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both 
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7, Comment. To determine whether the client 
will suffer a "substantial hardship," the Utah Rules "recognize[] that a balancing is required 
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." Id; see World Youth Day, 
866 F. Supp. 1297 (noting that "the underlying purpose of Rule 3.7 . . . is to avoid the prejudice 
associated with the jury confusion resulting from an attorney acting as both advocate and 
witness.") 
In the present case, the only possible issue with regard to the disqualification exceptions 
set forth in Rule 3.7 is whether D.J. will suffer a hardship if Snuffer is disqualified. The first two 
exceptions to the disqualification rule clearly do not apply because Snuffer's testimony would 
relate to a contested issue, the Settlement Agreement, and because the testimony is in no way 
related to the value of legal services rendered. 
Snuffer's disqualification will not "work a substantial hardship" on DJ. for a number of 
reasons. First, D.J. "could reasonably foresee" that Snuffer would be a witness since he was 
involved in all aspects of the settlement negotiations. See Mast Dep. at 75, Ex. B; Christiansen 
Dep. at 21, Ex. C. Second, D.J. has the financial means to obtain new counsel. Third, the Court 
has not scheduled a trial date and discovery, other than that pursuant to Rule 56(f), has just 
begun, so new counsel would have more than enough time to prepare for trial competently. By 
early disqualification, new counsel would have time to conduct discovery to support its theory of 
the case to the extent that might differ from Snuffer's. Furthermore, Westbrook would be 
prejudiced if Snuffer was not disqualified and allowed to testify since his roles as both advocate 
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and witness may confuse the jury. Such dual roles would cause Snuffer to "be easily subject to 
impeachment for interest and thus lessens his effectiveness as a witness." Leonard, 707 P.2d at 
653 (quoting Commonwealth v. Floyd, 431 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. 1981)). Consequently, D.J. will 
not suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer is disqualified. 
II. SNUFFER'S CONTINUED REPRESENTATION OF DJ. WOULD 
CONFUSE THE ROLE OF ADVOCATE AND WITNESS AND 
THEREFORE TAINT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS 
CASE. 
Even where a court determines that a lawyer is a "necessary" witness, the court must still 
analyze whether the proceedings could be conducted fairly were the lawyer allowed to 
participate as both advocate and witness. Thus, the "critical inquiry is whether the litigation can 
be conducted in fairness to all parties. Disqualification should not be imposed unless the claimed 
misconduct in some way 'taints' the trial or the legal system." World Youth Day, 866 F. Supp. 
at 1303 (emphasis added). Often, "there is a substantial risk that a jury will be confused by an 
advocate also appearing as a witness. The jury may attribute too much or too little weight to [the 
lawyer's] testimony because of his dual role." Id. Furthermore, where any "pretrial activity 
includes obtaining evidence which, if admitted at trial, would reveal the attorney's dual role," the 
lawyer should be disqualified from participation in any such activities. IdL; see also id. at 1304 
(noting that "the testimony from oral depositions .. . cannot easily be taken and read into 
evidence without revealing [the attorney's] identity as the deposing attorney"). 
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this matter would certainly confuse a jury 
since he participated significantly in the events underlying this litigation. His testimony will be 
crucial in determining the intended effect of the Settlement Agreement and whether Westbrook 
made false representations to DJ. Thus, given that he was one of the principal negotiators of the 
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Settlement Agreement, the jury may attribute "too much or too little" weight to Snuffer's 
testimony. This would be unfair for both sides and would certainly "taint" the trial. 
Furthermore, Snuffer's continued participation in any pretrial activities would also be 
unfair to both sides since these activities would likely reveal Snuffer's "dual role" as advocate 
and witness. Not only will depositions in which he participated or may participate be read into 
evidence, but Snuffer will himself probably be deposed. Additionally, D.J. has resisted 
deposition questions involving Snuffer. See Mast Dep. at 34-36, 82,197-98, Ex. B; Christiansen 
Dep. at 32-33, Ex. C. This resistance and continued representation can cloak collusion between 
fact witnesses (Mast and Snuffer) with the attorney-client communication privilege. In doing 
such, Westbrook's ability to rebut parol evidence is severely affected. That Westbrook can place 
its own representatives on the stand regarding the negotiations is not the same as being able to 
place representatives of D.J. on the stand to obtain inconsistencies in their accounts of the 
negotiations. These circumstances are unfair and will certainly taint the proceedings. Therefore, 
Snuffer should be disqualified from any further participation in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this case violates the ethical obligations of 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this 
case. Therefore, the Court should disqualify Denver Snuffer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 2004. 
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1 Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness. 
2 (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
3 necessary witness except where unless: 
4 (a)(1) Tfre-the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
5 (a)(2) The-the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in 
6 the case; or 
7 (a)(3) Disqualification disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship 
8 on the client. 
9 (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the-ajrial in which another lawyer in the 
10 lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 
11 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
12 Comment 
13 [11 Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the 
14 opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. 
15 Advocate-Witness Rule 
16 \2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or 
17 misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has 
18 proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the 
19 litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an 
20 advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not 
21 be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an 
22 analysis of the proof. 
23 f31 To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously 
24 serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in 
25 paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will 
26 be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) 
27 recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services 
28 rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify 
29 avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in 
30 such a situation the judge has first hand firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; 
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31 hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the 
32 testimony. 
33 [41 Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is 
34 required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing 
35 party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer 
36 prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the 
37 lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that 
38 of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the 
39 lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification 
40 on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee 
41 that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification 
42 conflict of interest principles stated in Rale-Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 fras-have no 
43 application to this aspect of the problem. 
44 [5]_Whothor the combination of rolos involves an improper Because the tribunal is 
45 not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer 
46 in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer 
47 to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest with respect to the client is 
48 determined by Rule 
49 Conflict of Interest 
50 [61 In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer 
51 will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give 
52 rise to a conflict of interest that will reguire compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For 
53 example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client 
54 and that of the lawyer,, or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper 
55 the representation involves a conflict of interest that reguires compliance with Rule 1.7. 
56 This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) 
57 from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's 
58 disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who 
59 might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph 
60 (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether 
61 the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing 
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62 party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of 
63 the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rulo 1.7. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm 
64 may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of If there is a conflict of interest, 
65 Rule 1.10 disqualifies the firm also, the lawyer must secure the client's informed 
66 consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking 
67 the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in 
68 writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent." 
69 [71 (Rule 3.8. Special responsibilities of a prosecutof4Paragraph (b) provides that a 
70 lawyer is not disgualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the 
71 lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however. 
72 the testifying lawyer would also be disgualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from 
73 representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from 
74 representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the 
75 conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
76 
